A Shrinking World
Demographics, Disengagement and Distrust by 2100
by Adam Rangihana
Demographics, Disengagement and Distrust by 2100
by Adam Rangihana
Demographics, Disengagement and Distrust by 2100
A Shrinking World:
Demographics, Disengagement and Distrust by 2100
By mid-century, the global population outlook has shifted dramatically. UN demographers now project a peak around 2080–85 at about 10.3 billion, with a slight decline to roughly 10.2 billion by 2100. The driver is a long-term fertility collapse: women worldwide are having on average one child fewer than in 1990, and by 2100 97% of countries will be below the replacement rate (2.1 births per woman). In practice this means most societies will age rapidly and many (especially in Europe, East Asia and North America) will eventually shrink without immigration. By the late 2070s, global projections suggest the number of people 65 and older will surpass children (under 18). In effect, the worldwide age structure will invert: young cohorts will form a smaller share of society, while the median age rises by a decade or more. This transformation is already underway – global population growth has slowed from 1.7% annually in 1950 to under 1% today – and will continue.
These demographic shifts are not uniform. Most of the expected population growth remains concentrated in lower-income regions, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, which is projected to account for over half of all births by 2100. In contrast, once-large populations like China, Japan, Russia and many European countries are ageing or set to decline. UN forecasts, for example, see Australia’s population growing from ~27 million today to about 43 million by 2100 (driven mainly by immigration), whereas New Zealand’s may only reach ~7–8 million (also reliant on migrants). In sum, the planet will become “demographically divided,” with a few fast-growing youthful societies and many aging, stagnant ones. This pattern will reconfigure economic power and geopolitics, as an IHME/Lancet analysis warns: demographic trends will “completely reconfigure the global economy and the international balance of power and will necessitate reorganizing societies”.
Economic and Labor Impacts of AgingAn older, slower-growing population portends slower economic expansion. A shrinking workforce can blunt output growth. IMF researchers note that by 2080–2100, population growth will be close to zero and the world’s median age will rise by roughly 11 years. As working-age cohorts shrink, labor supply and total output growth may slow markedly. Fewer young workers typically mean fewer new ideas and slower productivity gains. The result is a higher dependency ratio – more retirees per worker – straining public budgets for pensions and healthcare. Pension systems across advanced economies already face mounting costs from longevity; by 2100 the pressure will be enormous.
In many countries the labor market is already tightening. An OECD survey reports persistently high job vacancies in key sectors (healthcare, hospitality, construction) due to aging workforces and skill gaps. Aging itself slows labor-force growth: even if older people work longer, demographic momentum means there will be substantially fewer prime-age workers. (For example, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics projects that over 2020–2100 the U.S. working-age population will grow far more slowly than before.) Companies may use automation and AI to compensate, but technology can only replace some jobs and often creates new skill demands. Meanwhile, sluggish youth labor markets in many countries mean large cohorts of young people are not fully employed or underemployed. Altogether, the combination of an aging labor supply, skill mismatches and mediocre productivity growth threatens to drag on global GDP per capita.
These changes also transform the nature of work. Employers will increasingly struggle to fill roles; this may bid up wages in some fields (especially those requiring care or physical presence) and raise labor costs. At the same time, many economies will innovate to adapt: longer working lives, raising the retirement age, and re-training programs are expected to mitigate but not fully offset aging’s impact. As the OECD notes, extending careers can partially compensate for fewer workers, but cannot completely offset the employment decline caused by aging. In practice, governments will need to encourage higher labor-force participation among underrepresented groups – older people, women, youth – and invest in education and lifelong learning to maintain productivity. Both the IMF and OECD stress that policies should focus on adapting to demographic change: for instance, supporting healthy ageing, age-friendly workplaces and continuing training. In short, without major reforms the long-run trend is lower growth, higher per-capita social spending, and larger fiscal deficits.
Workforce Disaffection and Changing Work CultureJust as demographics are shifting, attitudes toward work are changing, especially among younger generations. Surveys find a growing gulf in employee engagement. In advanced economies, younger workers are markedly less engaged than older ones, even before the retirement of boomers. A recent Gallup analysis shows that post-pandemic the share of actively engaged Millennials and Gen Z workers has fallen significantly. Older employees (Baby Boomers) have maintained or increased engagement, but Millennials and Gen Z report higher rates of disengagement and detachment from their employers. Factors include lack of clear purpose, poor management support, and a desire for flexible or remote work. The so-called “quiet quitting” trend (workers doing bare minimum) is one symptom of this malaise.
In Australia and New Zealand, similar signs are emerging. For instance, a 2025 ADP survey found only 16% of Australian workers were fully engaged – the lowest level in a decade. Many Australians and New Zealanders cite stress, lack of work-life balance, or unsatisfying jobs. Remote and hybrid workers, common among younger staff, often feel more disconnected: ADP reports engagement is just 7% for exclusively remote Australian workers. Moreover, local data suggest many Kiwis also feel undervalued. A New Zealand media report (2020) noted over 60% of NZ respondents described themselves as “disengaged at work”. In both countries, workplace expectations have shifted: younger adults now prioritize meaningful work, flexibility and social responsibility. Employers are under pressure to adapt corporate cultures, or risk losing talent.
This disengagement has broad consequences. Disaffected workers are less productive and more likely to quit, adding friction to labor markets already strained by shortages. Growing worker fatigue and burnout can undermine innovation and service quality. Perhaps most importantly for societies, a pervasive sense of alienation at work can feed political and social discontent. When jobs fail to provide stability or purpose, people may drift away from civic engagement and lose faith in institutions. In that sense, work culture disaffection and institutional mistrust often reinforce each other: a disconnected workforce is both a symptom and a cause of declining trust in society’s arrangements.
Eroding Trust and the Fraying Social ContractAcross the democratic world, trust in institutions – governments, parties, media and even peers – has been weakening. Surveys find widespread dissatisfaction with democracy and skepticism toward leaders. Pew Research reports that a median of 59% of people in 24 countries say they are dissatisfied with how democracy is working. In many nations, that share is well over half. Only a few (like Sweden or India) report majority satisfaction. Notably, the upward trend in trust that briefly accompanied the early 2020s has mostly faded; in fact, of the 24 countries surveyed, only Australia and Mexico showed any recent uptick in democratic satisfaction.
More dramatically, indices of civil liberties and political rights are sliding globally. Freedom House’s 2025 report finds that 60 countries saw net declines in freedom in 2024, marking the 19th straight year of aggregate decline. Authoritarian practices – from election manipulation to repression of dissent – are spreading even in previously stable democracies. Voter turnout and party affiliation are also stagnating or falling among younger cohorts in many places. In the U.S., for example, trust in the federal government is near historic lows (only ~22% say they trust it “most of the time”), but disillusionment with institutions is similarly acute in Europe, Latin America and parts of Asia. Social trust (“most people can be trusted”) is likewise eroding in advanced societies.
Australians and New Zealanders have been comparatively resilient in this regard – both countries rank well on global trust surveys. An OECD trust study finds Australians show higher-than-average confidence in their public institutions (except international bodies). New Zealanders similarly report high trust in the police (73%) and courts (65%). But even here there are warning signs. A 2023 OECD review notes that NZ’s social cohesion – bolstered by a “team of five million” solidarity in the pandemic – could be tested by the spread of misinformation and polarized politics. And both countries have seen rising populist rhetoric and protest movements in recent years. In short, no advanced democracy is immune to the global tide of distrust.
Why does declining trust matter? As the OECD emphasizes, trust is the grease of democratic governance. High institutional trust reduces compliance costs, makes public policy easier to implement, and helps legitimize democratic norms. Conversely, when citizens perceive politicians as corrupt or indifferent, they become disengaged or cynical. In older societies this dynamic can amplify. With many retirees dependent on state pensions and healthcare, any perceived mismanagement can provoke intergenerational resentment. Younger voters feeling shut out may view democracy as stale or unfair. Scholars warn of a drift toward “gerontocracy”, where elderly voters dominate elections and policy priorities, marginalizing youth interests. Such an outcome would further undermine the social contract: retirees may resist paying higher taxes for schools or job programs that mostly benefit younger people, while younger generations may question why they shoulder the economic burden.
Interlinked Risks: Democracy, State Capacity and EconomyThe convergence of these trends – fewer workers, disaffected youth and shaken faith in institutions – creates a potentially volatile mix. Economically, aging and low fertility threaten long-term growth and fiscal stability. Politically, an unbalanced electorate risks skewing policy toward the interests of seniors (higher pensions, healthcare spending) at the expense of innovation and education. The result could be ossified politics and weaker institutions. Freedom House, for instance, warns of democratically elected leaders who “override institutional checks” and erode accountability in the name of security.
State capacity may suffer. Fewer working-age professionals can mean understaffed bureaucracies and weaker government services. For example, teacher shortages, healthcare worker gaps and even fewer bureaucrats to process visas or tax returns could become chronic. Additionally, if public trust is low, governments find it harder to marshal resources or win compliance with reforms (e.g. raising retirement ages or cutting benefits). In extremis, the frustration could fuel populist or authoritarian backlashes. Already, we see cases where youthful discontent (often fueled by economic stagnation) and an expanding older voter base have pushed countries toward more polarized or autocratic politics. Conversely, some fragile democracies may survive on the goodwill of their younger, tech-savvy citizens if the older generation weakens. The state of global democracy thus hangs in the balance, shaped by these demographic forces.
From a socio-economic standpoint, rich countries with aging populations may also face intergenerational tensions over issues like immigration. Migration flows can help plug labor gaps, but surges often provoke backlash. Past crises (e.g. Syrian refugees in Europe, Central American migrants in the US) show how sudden influxes can strain social cohesion and become political flashpoints. By late century, affluent nations may rely heavily on migrants for growth (the UN notes net migration is the main driver of population growth in 62 countries by 2100, including Australia and New Zealand). Managing this will require not only smart immigration policy but also public consensus – which in turn depends on trust and integration.
Australia and New Zealand: Regional OutlookAustralia and New Zealand illustrate these global trends on a local scale. Both have below-replacement fertility (Australia ~1.6, New Zealand ~1.6 births per woman) and rapidly aging populations. Official projections suggest Australia’s population could rise to roughly 43 million by 2100, largely on continued immigration. New Zealand’s might reach only about 7–8 million, assuming high migration; without it, NZ’s population would eventually shrink to “zero” in the extreme long run. In both countries, immigrants will become a growing share of the workforce and taxpayers. This long-term growth contrasts with many advanced peers, but mask underlying shifts: the elderly share will roughly double by 2100, and the working-age ratio will fall.
Economically, both governments face rising fiscal costs. New Zealand Treasury analysts warn that aging will dramatically increase spending on superannuation (pensions) and health care. Budget pressure is already evident: New Zealand’s Working Age to Elderly ratio could drop from ~4 today to under 2 by 2100. In Australia, the Productivity Commission and Treasury have similarly forecast rising health and aged-care costs. Politically, this means debates over taxes, retirement age and intergenerational equity will become more intense.
On labor markets, both countries already face chronic skill shortages (in sectors like nursing, teaching, construction and tech). With fertility low, they rely on skilled migration to fill gaps. Official guidance stresses that policy focus must be on boosting labor-force participation – of women, Māori/Pacific peoples in NZ, and older workers – and on improving productivity. Work culture is shifting too: surveys in Australia find growing disquiet among younger employees about job security and meaningful work, and New Zealand media regularly report high rates of worker disengagement.
In terms of trust and politics, Australia and NZ still enjoy robust institutions by world standards. Recent elections in both have been fair and peaceful, and rule of law remains strong. However, voters in each country are not entirely complacent. Issues like housing affordability, inequality and climate change have mobilized especially younger voters. The decline in satisfaction with democracy seen globally has had only a muted echo here – Pew finds Australians actually more satisfied with democracy than a year before – but faith in institutions is not guaranteed. For example, one OECD study notes that Australians who feel politically excluded or financially stressed tend to trust the government less. New Zealand saw large protests in 2022 (triggered by pandemic mandates and misinformation), illustrating that even in high-trust societies discontent can flare.
Implications and Policy ResponsesThese converging trends raise urgent policy questions. Governments must reckon with a future of slower growth and tighter budgets. Primary challenges include maintaining economic stability, sustaining generous welfare systems, and preserving the legitimacy of liberal democracy. Key policy imperatives likely include:
- Boosting Labor Participation: Encourage work at older ages (e.g. by raising retirement ages gradually), and engage under-represented groups. OECD experts highlight the importance of education and retraining, promoting healthy aging, and creating “age-friendly” workplaces and management cultures. For example, phased retirement, later pension eligibility, and lifelong learning programs can help meet labor demand.
- Immigration and Integration: Considerable immigration seems unavoidable to sustain population and labor supply. Policymakers will need clear strategies to attract needed skills while ensuring social integration and public support. Both Australia and NZ already select migrants by skills and family ties, but public concerns (over housing, social services, identity) must be addressed through open dialogue and robust community support. Internationally, collaborative migration management (and addressing root causes in origin countries) can reduce abrupt surges.
- Family and Fertility Policies: Some countries may try to nudge higher birth rates via family-friendly policies (child allowances, subsidized childcare, parental leave). Evidence suggests such measures have modest effects, but they remain part of a broad strategy. Without fertility roughly at replacement, however, immigration remains the only way to raise population.
- Economic Adaptation: On the economic front, governments must plan for lower revenue growth and higher social spending. Strategies include diversifying economic sectors, investing in productivity (through R&D, automation, improved infrastructure) and building fiscal buffers in good times. Some experts suggest shifting tax burdens (e.g. consumption taxes) or reforming pension financing to reflect longer lifespans. Careful fiscal planning is needed to avoid unsustainable deficits.
- Strengthening Social Cohesion: Rebuilding trust will be crucial. This means enhancing transparency, accountability and citizen engagement. Governments should guard institutional integrity (anti-corruption measures, independent judiciaries, responsive bureaucracy) so that citizens feel governments act in the public interest. Initiatives like participatory budgeting, citizen assemblies on key issues, or regular public consultations can help. Education on civic values, promotion of media literacy, and regulation to counter disinformation are also important to maintain an informed electorate.
- Adapting Social Safety Nets: Social insurance programs (pensions, healthcare) must be reformed for sustainability. Options include means-testing benefits, adjusting indexation, or encouraging private retirement savings. Healthcare systems will face surging demand; shifting to preventive care and better chronic disease management could mitigate costs. For Australia and NZ specifically, planning for the future of aged care (both home-based and facilities) is urgent.
ConclusionThe path to 2100 is uncertain, but current data paint a consistent picture: without intervention, many countries will grow older, fewer and more wary of their institutions. Global civilization may thus face a future of smaller workforces, slower economies, and simmering discontent, interlaced with pockets of youthful dynamism in parts of Africa and Asia. Australia and New Zealand, despite their relative prosperity, will not be immune: both must prepare for an older electorate and workforce, and guard their civic consensus. The challenge to liberal democracy is profound: ageing societies tend to be more risk-averse yet also more prone to demagoguery, unless institutions remain open and adaptive.
On the optimistic side, there is no deterministic doom. History shows humans are resourceful: immigration can rejuvenate populations; technology can raise productivity; and savvy policies can adapt welfare systems. However, these require effective governance and public buy-in. Scholars and institutions repeatedly warn that trust and engagement are the lubricants of reform. If trust erodes further, even wise policies may falter. As UN analysts note, the demographic landscape has changed “greatly in recent years,” presenting both opportunities (e.g. environmental relief from slower growth) and challenges. The decade ahead will be pivotal: governments that address demographic decline and social disengagement head-on – by building more inclusive economies and reinvigorating institutions – will steer their societies toward more stable futures. Those that cannot may watch liberal democracy and economic stability wane under the weight of an aging, skeptical world.
Sources: Authoritative projections and analyses from the UN, OECD, IMF, Pew Research, Gallup, Freedom House, and academic studies have been used to inform this assessment. The cited experts warn that demographic shifts will profoundly reshape economies and politics unless societies adapt through targeted policy reforms.
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